Abstract
advocates " [p] eace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and mutual benefit as the benefits of the BRI… By promoting practical cooperation in all fields and will work to build a community of shared interests, destiny and responsibility featuring mutual political trust, economic integration and cultural inclusiveness". This Chinese vision seeks to replicate and expand the results of the Asian Miracle. The economic takeoff of East Asia consolidated domestic stability in most countries; Likewise, regional peace dramatically improved as countries realized that a focus on economic growth would bring more stability (Overholt 2015) .
However, CEEC and Asia are two very different realities and identifying how the BRI can function in a non-Asian land becomes essential. The necessity here is to determine which are the channels and modus operandi of the BRI, and how it can actually be implemented in a given group of states through the regional approach. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze and understand this specific cooperation mechanism between CCEC and China, in three different perspectives: first, by analyzing leadership discourse and policymaking; second, by considering the 16 nations of CEEC as distinct economic and social entities and third, by understanding the significance of high level political summits and how much they actually impact upon a project's implementation.
The keyword for BRI seems to be infrastructure. The Chinese authorities see infrastructure (with the outcome of facilitating transportation) as the milestone for what will be the Eurasian "Economic Corridor".
Xi Jinping: the man with a dream and plan
In order to better understand the BRI's impact outside China, it is essential to seek an organizing principle in terms of the PRC's overall foreign policy objectives. For this it is important to know the "fifth generation of Chinese leaders", 1 guided by Xi Jinping. 
China-CEEC partnership framework
According to Xi (2006: 47) , geostrategic policymaking "represents a country's effort in the world arena to use geographic orientation and principles to pursue and safeguard its national interests.
Entering the twenty-first century, China's geostrategic relationships are undergoing profound change". Returning to economic and social differences between the CEEC, we will now inspect some important statistical indicators: As we can see from Table 1, Regarding the business and trade environment of the CEEC there are still uncertainties and different levels of performance amongst the group.
For example, the ease of doing business (The World Bank, 2016?).varies hugely, with the most business friendly being Estonia and the least, Albania.
Regarding exports and imports (for both, services and goods) the total volume goes mainly according to population, the larger the population the higher this index. In terms of FDI the most attractive are Poland and Romania, and the least attractive are the FYROM and Montenegro.
Regarding consumer prices we see 10 countries with deflation of those prices and five with low inflation percentages. And last, Table 2 shows us that the natural resources of all of those countries show very little contribution to their overall economic performance.
Cooperation Mechanism of "16+1" and the pivot on investments
This political and economic partnership is quite peculiar, no aggregation, international network or association could embody the same aspects as the "16+1". Institutionally everything started in April 2011 when Wen Jiaobao visited Eastern Europe, starting from Poland. The next step of cooperation was to call yearly summits where all leaders would meet in a joint session and after that, if representatives desired, meetings would proceed to bilateral talks.
The first China CEEC Summit was held in Warsaw in 2012, and had emblematic significance since the prime ministers of these countries had never before been all gathered in the same venue.
Usually all Heads of States and decision-making personalities are present at these summits ( promised to provide 5000 scholarships for students of these countries in order for them to study in the PRC; a forum on cultural cooperation would be held and a tourism promotion alliance would be established.
In addition, premier Wen Jiabao introduced a four-point proposal on promoting and deepening relations within the "16+1" platform by focusing on establishing a perfect working mechanism, exchange platforms of cooperation, specify priorities of cooperation and enhance closer cultural and people-to-people exchange. Politically, the most important pronouncement of premier Wen was: "Chinese leaders hope that the two sides will make joint efforts to inject new vitality on the development of China-Europe relations". Essentially, the hidden message here (confirmed in a formal declaration two years later) is that the "16+1" is an integral part of China-EU cooperation, and not an isolated foreign policy strategy oriented only towards these 16 countries. On the other hand, From the abovementioned activities we can see that the plan is no longer conceptual, but implementation has already started and has progressed with significant steps.
Challenges of cooperation
This diversity of views about the implications of China's rise in global politics is testimony to the uncertainty associated with that rise. But one aspect is abiding: As Shambaugh (2013: 317) states, "China going global will undoubtedly be the most significant development in international relations in the years ahead. Since China's opening to the world in 1978, the world has changed China -and now China is beginning to change the world". A lot has been written on the challenges that the BRI could face in its implementation and the same can be said for its extension, the "16+1" cooperation platform. In any cooperation plan where a lot of countries are involved, difficulties are inevitable.
Internal challenges
First and foremost, the different stages of development for each of the CEEC could slow down the development of projects. There are differences in the structure of the CEEC economies, the division of the group into EU and non-EU states, into nations which are part of the Eurozone and those who are not. This makes it difficult to devise a uniform approach towards the countries under analysis. It must also be underlined that the 16 nations do not shape a single coalition and they sometimes see each-other as opponents and, to some degree, they struggle with who and how will earn the most out of the flow of Chinese investments towards the region (Turcsanyi 2014). As a consequence, coordination within the group is lacking. The most successful investment for now has been the Hungary-Serbia railway, in which both countries showed economic and political maturity in developing the project funded with Chinese money; but for the remaining countries there is still a long way to go.
The next internal challenges are the governments of some of the countries involved in the cooperation mechanism. Especially in the Balkan Peninsula, most of them are "fragile democracies", not more than 30 years old.
Transitioning from one governance system to another is never without consequences. Such states suffer social instability, financial fluctuations, institutional fragility and last but not least, corruption. Antagonism between Balkan countries is another issue. Perhaps it is not an existential threat to the cooperation mechanism, but let us not forget that 17 years ago there were actual armed conflicts in the region and the repercussions of these conflicts are still unfolding in the region.
External challenges
The Chinese official standpoint is that of including the China-CEEC relations under the China-EU framework and cooperation structure. We must highlight here that eleven countries within the "16+1" mechanism are members of the EU, and three of them are founding members. 5 Long (2014), argues that "the EU takes a suspicious and cautious attitude to the establishment and development of the China-CEEC cooperation mechanism. The EU is concerned that China is trying to achieve a political objective in dividing the EU countries through economic means, and regrouping EU states according to their attitudes towards China. Such a strategy would weaken the appeal of Brussels and prevent its consistency in foreign policy". Another important factor to consider in this agenda is United States as 'Pragmatic'; we will have to see in the next years if his assessments of these countries will also apply to the "16+1" cooperation mechanism.
A further discontent is circulated about the absence of long term clarity of deals and plans as well as the possible undermining of the market potential of European companies and organizations. Casarini (2015: 9) claims that "infrastructure works financed by China's soft loans are carried out by China an indirect say in European affairs, they have also signaled to the U.S. and the West that Beijing is ready to advance its own agenda in the region."
The term "mutual distrust' is often used in describing the China-US political relationship, however we might see it more often used in the future to describe China-EU relations. Le Chorre and Sepulchre (2016) name an entire chapter of their book 'Spreading the tentacles, opportunistically' referring to the Chinese investments in Europe. They argue that the evergrowing Chinese presence in Europe is working to expand Beijing's power through finance and infrastructure.
The challenges go both ways. Since its creation in 1993, the EU has continued to provide one of China's most visible multilateral challenges.
Beijing has had to adjust its European policies to take into account both Union and country-level decision-making procedures, further complicated by the lack of single cohesive EU foreign and often economic policy (Lanteigne 2013: 144) .
Many seem concerned about what is not proclaimed in the plan; which is the final aim of this terrestrial expansion throughout the Belt and Road countries. What the skeptics fail to admit is that securing economic growth is at the core of national security policy proclaimed from Beijing and to further ease worries, President Xi has emphasized the "Three No's" policy within the BRI: China will not interfere in the internal affairs of the nations along the BRI route; will not try to increase its influence towards these nations; and last but not least, PRC is not striving for hegemony or dominance.
Conclusions
China's ascent as an important factor in the international arena is the most Although China is much larger than Central and Eastern European countries in term of area, population and the size of its economy, China has sought to build partnership with the CEEC on an equal footing.
The "16+1" cooperation framework, in which each country is an equal partner, can serve as the platform to enhance every country's interests.
The China-CEEC summits bear compelling significance in their origin and operation. They not only express the seriousness with which Beijing is dealing with the situation but also the meeting schedule demonstrates the commitment of the parties involved.
The Chinese behavior in the CEEC group should be viewed as both pragmatic and proactive. Chinese behavior was proactive because it was the PRC who initiated the entire process of cooperation, and pragmatic because the emphasis is always on win-win cooperation and easy access to trade and investments. However, this cooperation faces many challenges, inwards and outwards the same mechanism.
In a situation where 16 nation states of Central and Eastern Europe with individual historical, social and economic backgrounds meet and schedule a cooperation mechanism with a "civilization state" such as China, progress is not always smooth. Even in the very short lifespan of only a few years, the "16+1" platform has triggered reluctance, concerns and sometimes discontent, both within and outside the group.
Even though regionally-led implementation of projects is less expensive and moves at a faster pace than traditional technical assistance from a global perspective, in order for China-CEEC cooperation to properly function every aspect of participation should be conducted through policy communication and the coordination of objectives.
While analyzing Chinese behavior in the region one point is vital: commercial exchange. Every diplomatic, political and economic approach the PRC has towards the region is just an extension of Beijing's actual foreign policy: cooperation through mutual benefit and progress. 
